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Is Global Governance Safe for Democracy?
Joel Richard Paul*
Contemporary critics of international legal institutions often frame their
opposition in terms of a conflict between global governance and national democratic
accountability. Both liberal and conservative critics view international entities like the
United Nations, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), or the European Union
as steadily infringing upon national autonomy. In the United States, this debate often
echoes the isolationist strains of earlier arguments that European colonialism,
corruption, revolution, immigration, the League of Nations, or totalitarianism
threatened American exceptionalism. Throughout US history, opponents of
internationalism have called for disengagement from the world's troubles. The critics
of the United Nations and the human rights covenants stand with the opponents of
the League and the proponents of the Bricker Amendment as resisting the ceaseless
tide of internationalism.
That said, Professor Paul Stephan does not fit easily into either the left or the
right camp of critics. Stephan has earned a reputation as an independent and original
thinker in international law. His sophisticated critique of global governance focuses on
the process of lawmaking rather than on its substance. Stephan raises democratic
process concerns both with the creation of customary international law and the
development of international institutions, which he terms "new international law." By
addressing the way that international norms develop, rather than the norms
themselves, Stephan's thoughtful critique cuts deeper than many other contemporary
critiques. I find much in Professor Stephan's analysis persuasive. Nevertheless, in my
judgment Stephan both overstates and understates the nature of the challenge that
global governance poses to American democracy.
One may begin by examining Stephan's argument against customary
international law. Customary international law is the general practice of states
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accepted as law.2 To prove that a norm is customary international law, one must show
that almost all states, or at least an identifiable group of states, actually practice this
norm. If a particular state expressly objects to the norm during the norm's formation,
the state is not bound by it. States are only bound by norms to which they consent,
either implicitly or explicitly. In addition, to prove that a general practice is a
customary legal norm and not merely a customary practice, one must show that states
follow this practice out of a sense of legal obligation or opiniojuris sive necessitatis.
Stephan points out that courts often rely on the judgment of international legal
scholars to determine whether a particular practice is in fact opiniojuris. Doubtless, the
personal biases of legal scholars inform their opinions and may indirectly influence
courts. A legal scholar who opposes the death penalty may be inclined to conclude
that the reason virtually all industrialized countries have abandoned capital
punishment is out of a sense of opinio juris. In Stephan's view, applying customary
international law in US courts has allowed an intellectual elite to impose its political
preferences through the courts on an unwitting nation. I have three responses to this
democratic process concern.
First, customary international law does not spring fully formed like Minerva
from the minds of legal academics. The international common law process is both
more nuanced and more familiar to our legal system. Legal experts often advise courts
about the state of the law, and judges regularly consult treatises and law review articles
to help them decide cases. Typically, both sides in a legal dispute might present
evidence from scholarly authorities. Judges reach their own opinions based upon the
weight of the arguments on both sides.
Several mechanisms constrain judicial freedom to decide cases according to
principles of customary international law. Courts are held accountable for their
decisions by appellate courts, the bar, the legal academy, and ultimately the legislature,
which can reverse any judicial interpretation of customary international law by statute.
The US Constitution grants Congress the exclusive power to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations.3 Congress can decide what customary international
law is, or ought to be, in US courts. Courts also defer to the executive in their
determinations of customary international law.4 Thus, as a practical matter, the
executive and legislative branches have at least as large a role as the courts in
determining customary international law. Most importantly, customary international
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1)(b) <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasicrexr/ibasicstatute.htm> (visited Sept 16, 2000).
3. US Const Art I, §§ 8, 10.
4. 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 112, comment c (ALl 1987).
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law can always be superseded by legislative, executive or judicial action.' When courts
reach conclusions that are inconsistent with the political will, Congress has acted to
reverse the result.6
Second, when one compares customary international law to the common law,
one finds that customary international law is no less likely to reflect the democratic
consensus than common law does. Judges applying either customary international law
or general common law create law informed by their own reading of the relevant
precedents and the writings of legal scholars. Stephan argues that customary
international law, unlike the common law, does more than merely fill interstices in
legislative enactments. In fact, common law does not merely fill gaps in legislation.
Historically, common law courts created new law that preceded legislative
enactments. By contrast, customary international law is not purely court-made law,
because courts derive customary international law from their observation of actual
state behavior. If the sovereign objects to a new customary international norm, the
sovereign is not bound by it. A common law judge may decide that capital punishment
violates some state or federal constitutional principle and strike down a penalty
enacted by the legislature. By contrast, a US court interpreting customary
international law is unlikely to strike down a capital punishment statute. Even if all
other industrialized states insist that the death penalty violates customary
international norms, the United States is not bound by the general practice of other
states, if it expressly objects. In this sense, customary international law is more
deferential to US democracy than common law is.
Third, what US courts interpret and apply as customary international law is
often US constitutional law in disguise. In other words, courts derive international
norms from the principles of separation of powers and federalism, principles that
reflect the unique American experience. For example, the act of state doctrine holds
that a US court should not question the validity of a foreign government's acts of state
within that government's own territory.7 In the past, some US courts have confused
the act of state doctrine with customary international law or comity.' More recently,
5. See The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900) (stating that "where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations....").
6. For example, following the Supreme Court's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US
398 (1964), Congress adopted the Hickenlooper Amendment, designed to protect the right of US
investors to prompt, adequate and effective compensation in the event of expropriation according to
Congress's determination of the applicable customary international norm. Foreign Assistance Act,
Hickenlooper Amendment, Pub L 88-633, pt III, § 301(d)(4), 78 Star 1013 (Oct 7, 1967), codified
at 22 USC § 2370(e)(2) (2000).
7. See Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964) (cited in note 6) (holding that a US court cannot question the
validity of a foreign state's expropriation of property within its own territory).
8. See First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 US 759, 765 (1972) ('The act of state




however, the Supreme Court has characterized the act of state doctrine as derived
from separation of powers principles found in the Constitution! Indeed, foreign
courts rarely apply an equivalent act of state doctrine."
Another example of the confusion between customary international law and
constitutionally-derived principles arises in connection with the doctrine of
international comity. International comity often requires US courts to apply foreign
law, defer to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, or enforce foreign judgments. To justify
these actions, US courts generally say that they are deferring out of respect for the
foreign sovereign. Close examination reveals that no other country justifies its conflicts
principles based upon a rule of international comity." In fact, Justice Joseph Story
introduced into US law the notion of international comity in his Commentaries on the
Conflicts of Law.' Story borrowed the idea from an opinion of Lord Mansfield, 3 who
discovered comity in the writings of an obscure 17th century Dutch jurist, Ulrich
Huber. Huber wrote that a court may apply the law of another state out of comity, by
which he meant courtesy or protocol. 4 Justice Story reinvented comity as a solution to
the conflict between the slave and free states. Applying the principle of comity, Story
meant that free states would apply the law of slave states but would not be obligated
sovereigns"); Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897) (holding that "[e]very sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit injudgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory"); Oetjen v
Central Leather Co, 246 US 297, 303-304 (1918) (staring that the act of state doctrine rests upon "the
highest considerations of international comity and expediency"). Compare with W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co v Environmental Tectonics Corp, 493 US 400 (1990) (Ve once viewed the [act of state] doctrine as
an expression of international law ... We have more recently described it, however, as a consequence
of domestic separation of powers....").
9. See, for example, W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 US at 404 (1990) (cited in note 8) (acknowledging that the
Court's view of the act of state doctrine has evolved from relying upon customary international law
as its source to recognizing that the doctrine is "a consequence of domestic separation of powers");
First National, 406 US at 765 (cited in note 8) (reaffirming that the act of state doctrine is intended
to prevent the courts from interfering with the "conduct of foreign relations by the political branches
of the government"); Sabbatino, 376 US at 423 (cited in note 6) (stating that the act of state doctrine
has "constitutional underpinnings").
lo. Admittedly, the House of Lords in the last twenty years has adopted a limited act of state doctrine
in cases of expropriation. See Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer, 1982 AC 888 (HL(E)). With rare
exception, other foreign courts have not followed suit. See, however, 1 Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations at § 443, rep n 12 (cited in note 4) (referring to cases where foreign courts have
applied the doctrine).
is. See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 Harv Ind LJ 1, 27-44 (1991).
12. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic ch II, §§ 29-38 (Hilliard, Gray
1834).
13. See Somerset v Stewart, 98 Eng Rep 499 (1772) (holding that an American slave, who initiated process
against his master while in England, must be set free under English law).
14. Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum, cited and quoted in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu
Legum, 13 11 L Rev 375 (1919).
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to recognize the property rights of slave owners in conflict with the public policy of
the free state.
Story's naive faith in comity formed the foundation for all of US private
international law."5 Today, courts adhere to international comity both to avoid
interference in the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches and to protect
the autonomy and justified expectations of private parties to international contracts. 6
None of these purposes is compelled by customary international law.
I presume that Stephan's criticism of customary international law is not aimed at
either of these doctrines. He more likely aims to criticize the one aspect of customary
international lawmaking in which academics bave played a significant role: the
development of human rights law. Ever since the Second Circuit applied the Alien
Tort Claims Act to provide a remedy for egregious human rights violations overseas,17
human rights advocates have brought claims to US courts bolstered by the testimony
and affidavits of US law professors. Perhaps Stephan is correct in his assertion that
some of these academics have disproportionately influenced the jurisprudence in this
field without reference to any underlying legislation and with only weak evidence of an
emerging international customary norm. Even if Stephan is correct, does it threaten
US democracy to permit a plaintiff to collect money damages against a foreign official
who has committed kidnapping, rape, torture or murder? It is hard to imagine that a
majority of Americans or a majority of Congress would disagree with the proposition
that torture constitutes a violation of customary international law. US democracy can
only be strengthened by US courts defending human rights principles on the basis of
customary international norms.
In sum, the claim that the process of making customary international law
threatens democracy is not persuasive. But what of Stephan's second claim that the
development of new international law threatens the democratic process?
New international institutions like the WTO and the North American Free
Trade Agreement often seek to displace domestic laws and regulations that conflict
with international norms. For example, the WTO and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") dispute settlement panels have ruled that US laws
15. See Paul, 32 Harv Ind LJ at 22-24 (dted in note 11).
16. Id at 54-70. See for example, Mitsubisbi Motors Corp v Soler Cbrysler-Plymoutb Inc, 473 US 614 (1985)
(enforcing an arbitration clause in an international contract based on concerns of comity and the
need to protect the parties' expectations); The Bremen v Zapata Off-shore Co, 407 US 1 (1972)
(enforcing a choice of forum clause out of respect for foreign courts).
17. See Filartiga v Peha-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980) (holding that under the Alien Tort Claims Act,




protecting sea turtles,"8 dolphins,19 and clean air," and certain US tax laws violate the
GATT."' Stephan argues that these new international institutions impose
international standards upon the United States, threatening its democracy. Stephan
points out that these international institutions are not democratically accountable-
they usually operate in secrecy and generally only the executive branch participates in
decision-making that may displace congressional authority.
I share Stephan's concern that these international institutions threaten
democracy because of their lack of public accountability and secret decision-making,
but I disagree with his proposed solution. Stephan recommends that we rely on the
fast-track model of legislation in which the executive must submit a trade agreement
to Congress for a simple majority vote of both houses before the agreement can take
effect. Applying the fast-track procedure, Congress would vote on the agreement in an
abbreviated period of time without any amendments, filibusters, or delays. Stephan
would extend the fast-track model to non-trade-related international agreements as
well.
In my view, rather than solving the problem, the fast-track model lies at its core.
It is both the cause and consequence of the slow erosion of congressional power in
favor of executive authority in foreign relations. The fast-track model offers the
executive an alternative to an Article II treaty, which would require approval by a
supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate. If the president does not believe he can
command the support of a supermajority of the Senate, he may try to negotiate a fast-
track agreement. While it is true that the fast-track model often involves congressional
leaders during part of the actual negotiations, it prevents Congress from altering the
final product of the negotiations, and it puts pressure on Congress to approve the
agreement quickly. By expediting congressional action, the fast-track model often
means that there is less time for a thorough public debate that would air all the
arguments. Indeed, the executive can use the fast-track to speed an agreement through
Congress before public opposition builds. If the president does not have enough
congressional support for a fast-track agreement, and he does not need implementing
legislation, then he may sign the agreement acting alone as a "sole executive
18. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, US-Import Prohibition of Certain
Sbrimp and Sbrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).
19. US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R GATT BISD (unpublished report) (not adopted)
(June 16, 1994), printed in 33 ILM 839 (1994).
20. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, US-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29,1996).
21. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, US-Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb 24, 2000).
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agreement." Even without implementing legislation, some sole executive agreements
have displaced US state' and federal law.
3
The fast-track model allows the executive to perform an end-run around the US
Senate in the name of expediency. The rhetoric of executive expediency has justified
the concentration of authority in the executive branch since the beginning of the Cold
War. Arguably, during the Cold War the threat of Soviet aggression and the urgency
created by nuclear missiles may have justified allowing the executive to operate in
secret without congressional participation. A decade after the end of the Cold War,
there is less urgency and more opportunity for public deliberation. In a world in which
the Soviet Union does not threaten the United States or its allies, the executive
expedien 7T argument does not justify abdicating congressional power to the
executive.
If the Senate were to insist that the president submit international agreements
for the Senate's advice and consent as required by Article II of the Constitution, the
Senate would have adequate time and opportunity for a full public debate.' To obtain
a supermajority of senators, the president would have to negotiate an agreement that
adequately addressed Senate concerns. If the Senate were dissatisfied with the treaty
as negotiated, it could amend the treaty or impose reservations and understandings to
clarify the treaty's terms. The final treaty that would emerge from the Senate would
therefore represent a broad consensus of the demos. As an added benefit, the United
States would more likely honor an agreement approved through this deliberative
process.
One strategy for containing executive power in foreign relations is to take
seriously the Senate's power to advise on and consent to treaties. More generally,
courts must compel Congress to take responsibility for the exercise of its
constitutional powers to regulate foreign commerce and the military. The failure of
the courts and Congress to limit executive power is most evident with regard to the
war power. Since Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution ("W'PR")6 in 1973,
no president has ever notified Congress as required under section 4(a)(1) of the
22. See United States v Pink, 315 US 203 (1942) (upholding the Litvinov Assignment of Russian assets to
the Federal Government even though it directly conflicted with New York State public policy of not
recognizing foreign expropriations without compensation).
23. See Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654 (1981) (upholding the Iranian Agreement by barring the
right of a US corporation to execute on a defaultjudgment against Iran, even though the suit against
Iran in principle was authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
24. See generally Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements,
86 Cal L Rev 671 (1998).
25. Although Paul Stephan has attributed to Laurence Tribe and me the "ingenious idea" of requiring
two-thirds of the Senate to give its advice and consent, I cannot take any credit; the framers thought
of it first.




Resolution before sendingUS forces into combat.' Presidents have sent US forces to
evacuate persons from South Vietnam during the collapse of Saigon, free a merchant
vessel captured by Cambodia, assist the Government of El Salvador during its civil
war, maintain peace in Lebanon, invade Grenada and Panama, escort Kuwaiti ships
through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, repel Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
and its attack on its own nationals, bomb Libya and Serbia, and impose peace on
Somalia and Kosovo-all without regard for the WPR. Members of Congress have
repeatedly sought to enforce the act in the courts, but the courts have refused to
exercise jurisdiction either because they regarded the issue as nonjusticiable or they
questioned the standing of members of Congress.'
To restore balance to the Constitution, the courts should exercise jurisdiction
over any claim arising from the president's failure to invoke the WPR. By forcing the
president to provide the required notice to Congress, the courts would compel
Congress to decide within sixty days whether to authorize the use of force. Whether
Congress approves or disapproves of the president's action, Congress should be
obliged to say so. The present situation allows Congress to take the course of least
resistance by doing nothing. At present, if the military exercise succeeds, Congress can
congratulate the president; it if fails, Congress can avoid the blame. But democracy
suffers when Congress does not make a decision, because the voters cannot hold their
representatives accountable for the use of military force. Moreover, when Congress
avoids taking responsibility for foreign commitments, US foreign policy suffers.
While Congress waits to see which way popular opinion is swinging, the United
States appears weak and irresolute. US allies cannot depend upon its foreign
commitments if the executive is acting without the public support of Congress. Thus,
courts would strengthen our democracy and our foreign policy by imposing upon
Congress the duty to decide on the record whether to support the president's use of
military forces. Enforcing the WPR is one illustration of how US courts could correct
the executive's encroachment on congressional foreign relations power.
Another area in which the executive's power has undermined constitutional
limitations concerns the use of executive agreements to settle outstanding property
claims against foreign governments. For example, when President Carter negotiated a
sole executive agreement for the release of US hostages from Iran, he agreed to bar
claims in US courts against the Government of Iran by US nationals and companies.
Such claims had been expressly authorized by Congress under the Foreign Sovereign
27. 50 USC § 1543(a)(1) provides that the president must notify Congress when military forces are sent
into "hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances." The president must terminate the use of armed forces within sixty days of giving
notice, unless the president obtains congressional approval or obtains an extension. See 50 USC §
1544(b).
28. See, for example, Delluns v Bush, 752 F Supp 1141 (D DC 1990); Lowry v Reagan, 676 F Supp 333
(D DC 1987); Crockett v Reagan, 558 F Supp 893 (D DC 1982).
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Immunities Act. In this case, the president unilaterally denied US nationals their due
process rights, effectively taking property rights without compensation. The Supreme
Court sustained President Carter's executive agreement, reasoning that since
Congress had consented to some claims settlement agreements in the past and had not
objected in this case, Congress had acquiesced in the president's action.' If
congressional silence can be read as acquiescence, then the president needs only
enough votes to sustain a veto in order to exercise foreign relations powers without
Congress. To respect congressional power over foreign relations, the courts should
refuse to give domestic effect to sole executive agreements that purport to regulate
commerce or private assets without congressional authority.'
Paul Stephan has raised important questions that cannot be addressed fully in
this brief response, but I do not agree with his characterization of the threat to
democratic process posed by customary international law or international institutions.
In my view, the real threat to democracy is posed not by international law or
institutions per se, but by the concentration of executive power, which the framers
wisely anticipated and sought to deter by the checks and balances that are the
hallmark of the US Constitution.
29. See Danes & Moore, 453 US at 686-688 (cited in note 23).
30. Another example of the use of sole executive agreements to override domestic law concerns the
GATT. President Truman signed the GATT as a sole executive agreement in 1947. Until it was
replaced in 1994, the GATT was never submitted for congressional approval. Yet US courts
repeatedly held that the GATT was domestically effective and displaced conflicting state statutes.
See, for example, Hawaii v Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1957) (holding that a requirement that grocers must
post notice if they sell foreign eggs violated GATT); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp v Superior Court,
208 Cal App 2d 803 (Cal Ct App 1962) (holding that San Francisco's domestic manufacture
requirement for electrical equipment violated GATT).
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